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  1 
1.  Introduction  
 
 In  his  Nichomachean Ethics, Aristotle associates vice with extreme behavior, excess on one 
end and deficiency on the other; virtue is a balance somewhere between these extremes.    Here, we 
seek understanding as to where virtue lies between patience and impatience in the typical decision 
process, or equivalently, between decisiveness and indecisiveness.   Decisiveness (or impatience) 
has virtue because it conserves decision resources, but patience (or indecisiveness) also has virtue 
because it protects against accepting a poor alternative as a choice.   
  Limited cognitive capacity bounds rationality (Simon, 1955), implying a deliberation cost 
arises as alternatives are considered (e.g., a foregone use of time).   Yet, it is common to abstract 
from deliberation cost, explicitly or implicitly assuming it to be zero.  In this unboundedly rational 
world, an optimal choice is made a set of alternatives, by assumption.  “Choice” in this world is the 
optimal response to the environment, and choice theory involves mapping optimal responses to 
environmental conditions.  This standard approach can fruitfully be used to predict how changes in 
a decision environment would be expected to affect the actions of a decision maker. 
Recognizing deliberation cost complicates the analysis because the choice no longer 
depends only upon the location of the optimum. The boundedly rational decision maker must seek a 
quality choice while simultaneously managing deliberation cost, so the decision process will also 
tend to affect the location of the choice.  A benefit from recognizing deliberation cost is that 
standard choice theory can be extended behaviorally (Pingle, 2006). A variety of behaviors can be 
explained as ways people cope with deliberation cost.  For the present purpose, some factors can as 
influence choice (i.e., patience/decisiveness), even though they may not affect the location of the 
optimal choice.
1      
It is tempting to think one can “fold in” deliberation cost and construct a second order 
optimization problem, so the decision-maker simultaneously decides both how to decide and what 
to decide.  We can learn by doing this (e.g., Baumol and Quandt (1964)).  However, an “infinite 
regress problem” arises because the second order problem must also be costly to solve (Conlisk 
                                                 
1 Kagan (1994), for example, explains why temperament can affect labor market outcomes.  More directly related to our 
study, Damasio (1995) reports instances where brain injuries did not significantly change scholastic test scores, but had 
profound negative consequences for labor market performance because of increased indecisiveness.  He gives an 
example of a patient who spent half an hour discussing contingencies that might make it difficult to schedule a meeting 
on a particular day. 
 
  2(1988, 1995), MacLeod (2002)).  Gigerenzer and Selton (2001, p.5) argue it is “inappropriate and 
misleading” to interpret bounded rationality as “a hidden form of optimization.”  They rather 
perceive it as the application of an “adaptive toolbox” of “fast and frugal” heuristics.  A heuristic is 
effective, not because it is an optimization algorithm, but because it fits a particular decision 
environment (Gigerenzer and Selton, 2001, p.9), simultaneously economizing on decision resources 
and yielding a high quality choice.  This perspective suggests individual non-cognitive 
characteristics like patience/decisiveness may influence choice by influencing the heuristic the 
decision maker applies in a given context.    
  Because the infinite regress problem limits the ability to derive theories of bounded 
rationality from the optimization assumption, experimentation is especially advantageous.  It allows 
us to empirically examine how people cope with deliberation cost.  Few experimental studies have 
examined decision behavior with deliberation cost, however.  An interesting exception is the “real 
effort experiment” of van Dijk, Sonnemans, and van Winden (2001).  They examine the impact of 
various incentive schemes on the decision effort put forth human subjects, measured as the number 
of costly steps taken in search of the optimum.
2    Our study is comparable in that we present human 
subjects with a series of optimization problems, and a subject must search through alternatives 
sequentially to arrive at a choice.
3  In considering whether to stop or continue the search, the 
decision maker faces a trade-off:  Conserve valuable decision resources or seek an improved 
decision, hoping the improvement will more than compensate for the decision resources used.
4  We 
view this as a ubiquitous decision problem, and one that is not fully understood.     
We deviate from van Dijk, Sonnemans, and van Winden by providing our subjects with 
more flexibility as to how they search.  We do not require subjects to start their search at a 
particular location, nor do we require successive trials to be adjacent.  On a given trial, our subjects 
are free to sample an alternative from anywhere in the search space.  While this weakening of 
experimental control increases the number of potential confounds, it is essential because we want to 
                                                 
2  Their primary finding was that tournament prizes induced a higher but more variable level of effort than piece rate 
pay or team remuneration, which did translate into improved decision performance. 
3 Simon (1955) argued that most real world decision making would involve the sequential comparison of alternatives 
because people have limited cognitive capacity.  This is consistent with theory on optimum seeking methods in 
mathematics (see Cooper and Steinberg (1970) and Wilde (1964)), where sequential search is generally recognized as 
being preferable to the simultaneous comparison of a number of alternatives because the information obtained from one 
trial in sequential search can be used strategically to select the location of the next trial. 
4 Payne, Bettman, and Johnson (1988) label this the “effort-accuracy” tradeoff, and they explore the processes by which 
people cope with it.     
  3consider how various factors interact.  By adopting this approach, we partially address the criticism 
that experimental environments can be so simplified that the results obtained from them will tend to 
be irrelevant.
 5  Further, our approach allows us to measure interactions and distinguish the relative 
impacts of various factors using econometric techniques.   
Nonetheless, we take advantage of experimental control.  We control for “aspiration 
uncertainty” by constructing optimization problems so the value of the objective function at the 
optimum is the same for each problem, and subjects are informed of this optimal value.
6  We also 
control for the self-selection problems that are typically present in field situations by confronting all 
subjects with the same set of varied problems.
7     
List and Harrison (2004) note that no matter how much experimental control is applied, 
human subjects bring differing experiences to experiments that may influence their behavior.  
Rather than try to control away all such differences through experimental design, we estimate fixed 
individual differences using the panel data from our experiment, and we distinguish the impacts of 
individual differences from the characteristics of the problem. Gigerenzer (2001) indicates fixed 
individual differences in decision behavior may occur because subjects possess different heuristics 
in their adaptive tool boxes.  Our primary interest is in whether there are fixed individual 
differences in patience/decisiveness, measured as the willingness to expend decision resources in 
costly search.  We use subject demographic data to gain insight about the origins of the 
unobservable fixed differences we estimate. We also explore the extent to which fixed differences 
in patience/decisiveness help explain differences in total decision performance for problems of 
varying complexity.
8    
Like van Dijk, Sonnemans, and van Winden (2001), we introduce treatments into our 
experiment to examine different incentives.  However, we start at a more fundamental level of 
analysis by examining the incentive frame.  Our incentive question is, “Controlling for other 
significant factors, can a change from a bonus to a penalty frame influence the quality of the 
decision, the willingness to search, or both?”  Lazear (1995, pp. 65-69) notes why the prospect 
theory of Tversky and Kahneman (1979, 1981, 1991) might explain a framing effect.  If a subject 
                                                 
5  See Falk and Fehr (2003) for a discussion of this criticism and the use of experimental methods in labor economics. 
6 MacLeod and Pingle (2005) illustrate how a discrete change in the level of aspiration uncertainty can affect decision 
behavior.   
7 See Angrist and Krueger (1999) for a discussion of various techniques that have been used in labor economics to 
address this self-selection problem.   
8 Harrison and Morgan (1990) explore the extent to which individuals use different search strategies, but do not ask the 
extent to which performance is specific to the individual.   
  4perceives the given wage as the “status quo” and is “loss averse,” then a penalty for not performing 
as well as possible should be more motivational than a bonus received for improvement.  So, a 
penalty frame should generate more patience in search, more decision resource use, and higher 
quality choices.  A competing alternative hypothesis is that the “positive reinforcement” of the 
bonus frame may motivate more search than the “negative reinforcement” of the penalty frame.
9   
  The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the experimental design. Section 3 
discusses the data obtained from the experiment and defines variables.  Section 4 presents detailed 
results.  Section 5 concludes with a summary of the results and some discussion.   
 
2   The Experiment 
  The experiment involves examining the behavior of human subjects as they solve a series of 
optimization problems, presented as an “effort allocation game.”  (See the Appendix for sample 
game instructions.)  For a given problem, 200 units of “effort” are allocated to varying “tasks.”  The 
dimensionality of the optimization problem increases with the number of tasks, which makes the 
problem more complex.  The most simple problem involves allocating effort to only two tasks, 
while the most complex involves an allocation to five tasks.   
  The quality of an allocation   is measured in “search points” S, where  ) , , , , ( 5 4 3 2 1 y y y y y










1 1 5 5 4 4 3 3 2 2 1 1 β β β β β α α α α α .   
The parameters ,  f i α  and  i β  are chosen so the maximum value for  ,  , is 50 for each 
problem, given the constraint 
S opt S
200 5 4 3 2 1 = + + + + y y y y y .  (Of course,  i α  and  i β  are set equal to 
zero for   for problems with   tasks.)  The subject is never shown this objective function, so  k i > 5 < k
                                                 
9 In psychology, reinforcement is defined to be a consequence that causes a targeted behavior to be more likely.  
Positive reinforcement motivates by introducing an attractive stimulus, which is called a “positive reinforcer,” 
subsequent to the targeted behavior.  “Negative reinforcement” motivates by removing an unattractive stimulus, which 
is called a “negative reinforcer,” subsequent to the targeted behavior.  Psychologists still dispute whether positive 
reinforcers are more effective motivators than negative reinforcers.  Heron (1987, p. 257) describes positive 
reinforcement as “the most widely applied principle of behavior,”  having been successfully applied “in numerous 
training and development programs across a wide variety of populations, settings, and behaviors.” Wiegand and Geller 
(2005) critique the use of “failure avoiding” negative reinforcers and extol “success-seeking” positive reinforcers.   
Alternatively, in is his provocative article, “What organizational behavioral analysis needs is more Jewish mothers,” 
Malott (2002)  argues that the fear of failure, or fear of not living up to high expectations, is a powerfully motivating 
negative reinforcer that is underappreciated.   
 
  5there is no opportunity to formulate and solve a mathematical optimization problem.  Rather, the subject 
must seek the optimum by engaging in sequential search.  
Search is costly.  For a given problem, the subject’s “efficiency bonus” is 
, which decreases as the number trial alternatives ALT1 increases.  At one 
extreme, if the subject accepts the first trial as the choice, the maximum efficiency bonus of 49.1 points is 
earned.  At the other extreme, the efficiency bonus equals zero and the game automatically terminates after 
the subject’s 25
2 ] 15 * 1 375 [ 1
γ γ ALT EFF − =
th trial. Because we are examining the willingness to search, we prefer that the subject choose 
to stop the search, rather than being censored.  A pilot experiment indicated that a very slight increase in the 
marginal cost of search encourages most subjects in this experimental setting to stop their search before 
reaching trial 25.  Setting the parameters  1 γ  and  2 γ  equal to 0.33 and 0.85 provides this slightly increasing 
marginal cost. With this design, a small amount of censoring did occur, but very little. 
  After entering a trial alternative, the subject has a maximum of 15 seconds to decide whether or 
not to continue the search.  Waiting longer than 15 seconds reduces the efficiency bonus, just as 
when an additional trial is actually used.    As long as a subject uses less than 15 seconds to enter a 
trial, the cost of search depends upon the number of trials, not time used.    This design feature 
serves two purposes.  First, it prevents differences in the ability to enter computer keystrokes from 
affecting the results, for 15 seconds is long enough for those less experienced with a keyboard to 
make an entry.  Second, it prevents a subject from being able to think without cost.     
  The experiment’s single treatment is the frame of the incentive: bonus versus penalty.  In the 
bonus group, a small fixed wage is paid, and a “decision bonus” increases to a maximum as the 
quality of the decision increases.  In the penalty group, a large fixed wage is paid, and a “decision 
penalty” decreases to a minimum as the quality of the decision increased.   
The “decision bonus” for the bonus group is  , the number of search points associated 
with the best of all the trial alternatives.  The “decision penalty” for a decision in the penalty group 
decision is  .  The only difference between the two groups is the frame of the incentive in 
that “total earnings” is the same when decision behavior is the same:   
max S
max S Sopt −
[] [ ]
Earnings   Total   Group Penalty   
Bonus   Efficiency   Penalty  Decision    -    Wage Group Penalty 
EFF   S 1
EFF   S 1





+ − − + =
+ + =
+ + =
S Sopt  
  6Figure 1 displays the game screen and a sample entry for a subject in the bonus group. This 
is the fourth game played by the subject.  The problem is the most complex 5 task type.  The second 
trial allocation, or search opportunity, is being considered. The subject is allocating 45 units of 
effort to tasks 1, 2, 3, and 4 on this trial. The computer has entered the balance of 20 units of effort 
to task 5. (For all games, the computer enters the allocation for the final task in this manner so that 
variation in decision performance does not occur because of variation in adding errors.) 
Figure 1:  The Game Screen 
Game 4 
Game Type: 5 Tasks 
Search Opportunity 2 
 
    B e s t    L a s t    2   B a c k  
Effort Level Y1:  45        45    34    0 
Effort Level Y2:  45        45    34    0 
Effort Level Y3:  45          45    34    0 
Effort Level Y4:  45          45    34    0 
Effort Level Y5:  20          20    64    0 
 
Search  Points:  7.4   7.4   -46.9   0 
 
     Continue  Search 
     S t o p   S e a r c h  
 
Wage:        1.0 
Decision Bonus:         7.4 
Efficiency Bonus:   47.4      Cost of Next Trial:  1.76 
Total Earnings:         55.8                             
 
              The trial (45,45,45,45,20) generates 7.4 search points.  The “Best” column indicates that 
this trial is the best trial made up through the current search opportunity.   The “Last” and “2 back” 
provide a short term “memory.”  This design feature limits the extent to which decision 
performance varies because of differences in short term memory capabilities.  In this example, the 
subject does not have to use memory to know that the previous trial (34,34,34,34,64) is worse than 
the current trial (45,45,45,45,20). 
In this example, the best trial in the search process is the current trial, and total earnings 
would be 55.8 points if this trial is accepted as the choice. These earnings are the sum of the wage 
(1), the decision bonus (7.4), and the efficiency bonus (47.4).  If a penalty group subject had made 
this same choice on the second search opportunity, then the total earnings would have been the 
  7same, but would have been calculated as 55.8=[1+50]-[50-7.4]+47.4, a wage of 51, a decision 
penalty of 42.6, and an efficiency bonus of 47.4.   
At this point, the subject must decide whether to continue searching or not.    There is no 
uncertainty about how much room there is for improvement in the quality of the choice.  Subjects in 
the bonus group know the maximum decision bonus is 50, and subjects in the penalty group know 
the minimum penalty is zero.    The subject is also shown the cost (in terms of lost efficiency bonus) 
of examining an additional trial alternative, so there is no uncertainty there.  The uncertainty present 
in the choice lies in the subject’s own subjective belief about his or her own ability to capture the 
improvement that is possible.  To continue searching, the subject hits the enter key, and enters 
another trial allocation. To stop searching, the subject selects the stop search option and hits the 
enter key, upon which the computer records the results and immediately begins the next game. 
  After reading the game instructions, all participants in a session play a single, highly 
structured, tutorial game called the “administrative game.”   Subjects are not allowed to experiment 
with this game on their own, but rather are told what to do step by step.  The administrative game 
ensures subjects understand what is presented on the computer screen and know how to navigate on 
the computer.   Subjects then play four “practice games,” to become exposed to each of the four 
game types.    
  Subjects then play the 20 games of the experiment.  A 2 task problem was played, then a 3 
task problem, 4 task problem,  an 5 task problem.  This pattern was repeated 4 times, allowing the 
effect of experience to be examined and controlled for.  For each problem type, set of optimal 
choices each provided an optimal search point value of 50, but were placed in dispersed locations.  
A Euclidean distance measure was used to ensure that the dispersion of the optimal choices for each 
problem type was roughly equivalent.    
       Each subject was paid the cumulative earnings generated by the 20 choices, after completing a 
questionnaire.  Subjects understood that the performance in one game, good or bad, does not affect 
the earnings opportunity in any future game, cumulative earnings was not shown during play.  For 
the typical participation time of about one hour, the average earnings level was $13.70, ranging 
from $10.13 to $16.78.  All were volunteer undergraduate students recruited from University of 
Nevada, Reno economics courses. A total of 52 subjects participated, 26 in the bonus group and 26 
in the penalty group.   
 
  83.   Data and Variables 
 
  SUBJECT is a categorical variable associated with the 52 participants.   Variables 
describing individual subject characteristics are associated with SUBJECT, including GROUP 
(0=bonus frame, 1=penalty frame), SEX (1=male), MAJOR (1=business), MARRY (1=married), 
FINAID (1=receiving), AGE (age in years), GPA (GPA on University of Nevada credits), CRED 
(number of college level credits completed), and WORK (average hours worked for pay per week). 
In addition to collecting demographic information, the questionnaire sought verbal 
descriptions of the subject’s search process.  Subjects were asked, “To the best of your ability, 
describe the method or methods you used when playing the effort allocation game.” The other 
question was, “To the best of your ability, describe how you decided when to stop searching.”  
Responses were varied but could be categorized according to whether a search method was used 
and according to the reported stopping rule.  This categorization provided the variables SSRULE 
(1=report systematic search rule of some sort), CBRULE (1=report comparing costs of additional 
search to benefits), BRULE (1= report consideration of benefits of additional search, but no 
mention of costs), CRULE (1=report consideration of costs of additional search, but no mention of 
benefits). 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics on subject demographics and decision rules.  Thirty-
seven percent of subjects provide some indication of using a systematic search method, while most 
provide no such evidence.  Only ten percent indicate that they compare the costs of additional 
search to the benefits.  A disproportionate 73 percent report consideration of the potential benefits 
of additional search, but not the costs, while 17 percent report the converse.   
The number of search opportunities used by the subject on a given choice problem, ALT1, 
ranges from 1 to 25.  Variables associated with ALT1 describe the decision process, and include the 
number of search points S generated by opportunity ALT1, the number of search points SMAX 
generated by the best trial alternative through search opportunity ALT1, the efficiency bonus EFF 
obtained if search is stopped on search opportunity ALT1.  FINAL is a dummy variable set equal to 
one when on the search opportunity when search stops, and set to zero otherwise.  That is, 
FINAL=1 identifies the alternative trial that is the choice for the given decision problem. 
 
 




Deviation Min Max 
Demographic          
    AGE  23.00 4.30 18 39 
    GPA  3.00 0.77 0.61 4.00 
    CRED  82.10 47.70 3 179 
    WORK  13.70 13.40 0 55 
    SEX  0.62 0.49 0 1 
    MAJOR  0.71 0.46 0 1 
    MARRY  0.08 0.27 0 1 
    FINAID  0.40 0.50 0 1 
Decision Rule   
    SSRULE  0.37 0.49 0 1 
    CRULE  0.10 0.30 0 1 
    BRULE  0.73 0.45 0 1 
    CBRULE  0.17 0.38 0 1 
Note:  There were 52 observations (subjects) on the 
demographic and decision rule variables 
   
Other variables defined for the analysis include ROUND, the problem number running from 
1 to 20;  TASK, the problem type, or number of tasks present in the problem, running from 2 to 5; 
and  , a dummy variable set to one when the subject has  i EXP 1,2,3,4 i =  previous experiences with 
the given problem type.  Other variables, constructed to examine results of interest, are identified 
and described below when the results are presented. 
With 52 subjects making 20 choices each, the data set included 1040 observations on 
choices (where FINAL=1).   Two outlier choices were removed in two cases where a subject 
unintentionally accepted a very poor choice (more than 4 standard deviations below the mean) even 
though many more search opportunities remained available. Consequently, the data set included 
observations 1038 choices.  
 
  104.   Results 
We model the degree of patience/decisiveness exhibited by a subject using a Cox 
proportional hazard model.  The probability  ) (t i θ  that subject   stops searching on trial alternative 
 is given by , where   is a vector of factors describing the subject’s state on trial 
, 
i
t ) ( ) (




β = it x
t β  is the set of parameters to be estimated, and   is the baseline hazard.  The baseline hazard 
is non-parametric, capturing the time varying nature of the “standard” willingness to stop the 
search.  When   includes person specific, time invariant characteristics, the baseline hazard 
does not depend upon the subject   (analogous to a regression with no fixed effects). When 
all individual characteristics are time varying, the data can be stratified to estimate a person specific 
baseline hazard (analogous to a regression with fixed effects).   
) (
0 t i θ
it x
) (
0 t i θ i
  Table 2 presents the results obtained from five hazard model regressions.  The “all tasks” 
regression uses data from all problem types, while the 2 task, 3 task, 4 task, and 5 task regressions 
use data only for the given problem type.  Of the 1,038 problems solved by all subjects, search was 
censored or terminated by the computer (after 25 trials) on 29 occasions.    We dropped these few 
censored choices from the hazard model regressions, for we seek understanding about why subjects 
choose to stop searching.  For the all tasks regression, this meant 8,155 trial allocations from the 
remaining 1,009 choice problems were used to estimate the propensity to stop search. 
  The “hazard ratio” for each explanatory variable is reported.
10  When the explanatory 
variable is categorical, one category must be left out of the regression to obtain identification.  In 
this case, the hazard ratio indicates the likelihood of stopping the search, relative to the category left 
out.  For example, the TASK4 variable is left out, so the hazard ratio of 10.57 reported for the 
TASK2 variable in the all tasks regression indicates that the average subject is 10.57 times more 
likely to stop searching when solving a 2 task problem than a 4 task problem, controlling for the 
other factors.  When the variable is not categorical, like the variables WORK and CRED, then a 
hazard ratio greater than one indicates a positive correlation between the variable and the 
probability of stopping the search, while a ratio less than one indicates a negative correlation.   
 
 
                                                 
10 One, two, and three asterisks represent significance at the ten, five, and one percent levels of significance.  Standard 
errors are not presented because they do not apply to the hazard ratios, but rather relate to the estimated coefficients for 
the factors.   
  11Table 2:  Hazard Ratios for the Dependent Variable ALT1 
Variable  All tasks  2 tasks  3 tasks  4 tasks  5 tasks 
GROUP  1.919***  1.216  2.05*** 3.17*** 1.807*** 
TASK2  10.57***             
TASK3  1.336***             
TASK5  0.761***             
SM10  3.168*** 2.401*** 2.736*** 4.387*** 3.251*** 
SM  20  1.976*** 2.201*** 1.502  3.131*** 1.411 
SM  30  1.430*** 1.500*  0.907  2.357*** 0.814 
SM  40  1.065 0.999 1.172 1.239 0.762 
SM  60  0.866 0.478**  0.569*  1.342 1.102 
SM  70  0.504*** 0.737  0.310*** 0.592  0.349*** 
SM  80  0.387*** 0.579  0.154*** 0.542  0.362** 
SM  90  0.324*** 0.345*** 0.331**  0.331**  0.455* 
SM  100  0.125*** 0.191*** 0.124**  0.000*** 0.260 
EXP2  1.305***  0.894 1.408 1.586**  1.536* 
EXP3  1.786***  1.400 0.779 1.530*  5.032*** 
EXP4  1.528***  0.689 0.950 3.285***  3.017*** 
EXP5  1.252**  0.956 0.883 1.384 0.850 
CRULE  9.399*** 4.779*** 12.07*** 29.15*** 45.70*** 
BRULE  3.416*** 1.130  6.008*** 7.969*** 10.53*** 
SSRULE  1.366***  1.229 1.210 1.516**  1.736*** 
GPA  1.303***      1.224** 2.24*** 2.058*** 
SEX  1.259***        2.214***  2.419*** 
WORK  1.009***        1.027***  1.032*** 
CRED  0.995*** 0.994***     0.992*** 0.994*** 
FINAID  0.752***     0.398*** 0.430*** 0.707** 
MARRY  0.736**           0.473*** 
MAJOR  1.839***     3.487*** 3.261*** 2.484*** 
ASIAN  0.566*** 0.576*** 0.318***     0.738* 
Age        0.931***       
Total  Trials 8155 708  2123 2518 2806 
Problems  1009  260 258 252 239 
Log  Likelihood  -7318.3 -1444.0 -1504.9 -1504.5 -1445.2 
LR  1548.9  175.1 276.4 320.7 365.6 
LR  p-value  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
    
  Of primary interest here is the impact of the incentive frame on patience/decisiveness.  In 
assessing this impact, we control for the complexity of the problem (using the TASK dummies), for 
experience (using the EXP dummies), for any reported decision methods (using CRULE, BRULE, 
and SSRULE), and for demographic characteristics (using the demographic variables presented in 
Table 1).  Importantly, we also control for how near the given trial allocation is to the optimum 
(using the dummies sm10 to sm100).  When sm10=1, the trial is among the nearest 10% of trials for 
the given problem type (e.g. 3 task problems).  At the other extreme, sm100=1 implies the trial is 
among the 10% of trials furthest from optimal for the given problem type.   
  12  The marginal impacts of the control variables are, for the most part, as would be expected.  
The probability of stopping the search increases at an increasing rate as the subject nears the 
optimum.  Reducing problem complexity increases the probability of stopping the search, as does 
experience (in general) and the use of a systematic search method (SSRULE=1). Subjects who 
reported using a stopping rule that focused only on the costs of search (CRULE=1) or only on the 
benefits (BRULE=1) tended to stop sooner than subjects who reported the consideration of both 
costs and benefits as they searched (left out variable CBRULE=1). 
  We ran “stratified sample” regressions to estimate individual baseline hazard ratios.  These 
results are not reported because controlling for unobserved individual differences in this manner did 
not significantly alter the hazard ratios reported for the other variables.  The regressions presented 
in Table 2 include the observable individual characteristics that significantly affect the willingness 
to stop the search.  We found more decisiveness (less patience) is associated with a higher GPA, 
being male, working more hours per week, being a business major, having fewer accumulated 
college credits.  Alternatively, more patience (less decisiveness) is associated with receiving 
financial aid, being married, and being Asian.   
  The very high hazard ratio for the 2 task problem in the “all tasks” regression indicates 
subjects especially economized on search in this most simple environment.  The separate 
regressions by problem type help uncover some interactions between problem complexity and other 
factors.  Those who reported using some kind of systematic search method (SSRULE=1) especially 
tended to stop their search sooner in the more complex 4 and 5 task problems, indicating that a 
benefit of using a systematic search method is being able to economize on decision costs when the 
search problem is more complex.   Likewise, experience and differences in individual demographic 
characteristics tended to have more impact when the problem was more complex.   
  Controlling for the other factors, the penalty incentive frame increased the probability of 
stopping the search relative to the bonus frame.  That is, we find that a penalty frame encourages 
decisiveness, while bonus frame encourages patience.  The larger hazard ratios for the 3 and 4 task 
problems indicate that this framing effect is stronger when the problem is of intermediate 
complexity.      
How do differences in patience/decisiveness affect decision performance?  Decision 
performance is measured by the TOTAL earnings, which is equal SMAX+EFF+1.  A larger value 
for EFF indicates less use of decision resources, so it is also and indication of more decisiveness 
  13(less patience).  A larger value for SMAX indicates higher decision quality.  The size of SMAX 
relative to EFF provides an indication of “composition” of total decision performance.  Table 3 
presents means, standard deviations, and coefficients of variation for TOTAL, SMAX, and EFF by 
problem type and by incentive frame.  
 
Table 3: Decision Performance by Problem Complexity and by Incentive Frame
(Means, Standard Deviations, Coefficients of Variation) 
Mean Performance (n=130) 
   Treatment  2 tasks  3 tasks  4 tasks  5 tasks 
Bonus  94.9 73.3 63.2 48.6 
TOTAL    Penalty  94.8 74.1 62.3 48.2 
Bonus 48.1  36.7  30.6*  18.2 
SMAX Penalty  47.4  36.7  26.8*  15.3 
Bonus 45.8  35.6  31.6*  29.4 
EFF Penalty  46.3  36.5  34.5*  31.9 
Performance Standard Deviation (n=130) 
   Treatment  2 tasks  3 tasks  4 tasks  5 tasks 
Bonus 6.2  19.5  23.2  35.5 
TOTAL    Penalty 5.7  17.3  22.5  35.2 
Bonus 3.8  17.1**  16.4  27.9 
SMAX Penalty  3.6  13.8**  18.6  31.1 
Bonus 5.1**  10.2  13.9***  15.1** 
EFF Penalty  4.2**  9.9  10.2***  12.4** 
Coefficient of Variation (n=130) 
   Treatment  2 tasks  3 tasks  4 tasks  5 tasks 
Bonus           0.065            0.266            0.367            0.730  
TOTAL  Penalty           0.060            0.233            0.361            0.730  
Bonus           0.079            0.466            0.536            1.533  
SMAX  Penalty           0.076            0.376            0.694            2.033  
Bonus           0.111            0.287            0.440            0.514  
EFF  Penalty           0.091            0.271            0.296            0.389  
*      Significant difference between the two treatments at 10% level of significance 
**    Significant difference between the two treatments at 5% level of significance  
***  Significant difference between the two treatments at 1% level of significance 
 
As would be expected, total decision performance decreases as problem complexity 
increases, and becomes more variable.   More interestingly, we find that the share of overall 
performance attributable to decision quality decreases as complexity increases.  For example, 
SMAX and EFF make roughly equal contributions to TOTAL earnings for the 2 task and 3 task 
problems, whereas EFF is about double SMAX for the 5 task problems.   
  14  Comparing the bonus and penalty incentive frames, there is no significant difference in 
overall performance at any problem complexity level.  However, when we decompose total 
performance, consistent differences do arise.   At each problem complexity level, subjects in the 
bonus group make higher quality choices (i.e., higher SMAX), while subjects in the penalty group 
economize more on the use of decision resources (i.e., higher EFF).  These differences are more 
pronounced for the more complex problem types, and very significant for the 4 task problems.   At 
all complexity levels, the use of decision resources varied more for bonus group subjects than 
penalty group subjects.  Thus, we find that the bonus frame encourages the patient use of decision 
resources, while the penalty frame encourages decisiveness that conserves decision resources.  
Moving from a bonus frame to penalty frame reduces the variability in the degree of 
patience/decisiveness observed.   
  We are interested in whether fixed individual differences in patience decisiveness are 
exhibited.    To estimate fixed differences, we model the decision performance of subjects as a 
function of the observable characteristics of the decision problem.  After experimenting with 
different functional forms, we chose the relationship  , which 
becomes 
it i t it it e e e e TOTAL
s f x
it
ε μ β ) ( ) 101 /( 1 = −
it i t it it it s f x TOTAL ε μ β + + + = − − ) ( ) 101 ln(  after taking the natural log.   is the 
decision performance of the individual   on problem t, which reaches a maximum for each 
problem at a value just under 100.   Thus, 
it TOTAL
i
) 101 ln( it TOTAL − −  is a measure of the distance from the 
optimum.    The coefficients it β  are the estimated marginal effects of the factors ,  which vary 
either by the problem   or by the individual  ;   is the number of search points earned on the first 
trial choice (when ALT1=1) for problem t, and  is a general step function explained further 
below; 
it x
t i t s
) (s f
i μ  is the individual fixed effect for individual  ; and  i it ε  is a random error.  The fact that 
this semi-log specification resulted in a better fit than linear specifications indicates that obtaining 
improved performance is more difficult to as the optimal choice is approached, regardless what 
factor is generating the improvement.  An analogous functional form was applied to model decision 
quality SMAX and to model decision efficiency EFF.    Table 4 presents the results of these 
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   Total Performance  Decision Quality Decision  Efficiency 
Variable  (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
Constant -3.480 -3.544 -3.709 -2.795 -2.899 -2.483 -2.574 -2.606 -3.750
    (0.077)*** (0.072)*** (0.177)*** (0.109)*** (0.095)*** (0.142)*** (0.105)*** (0.087)*** (0.235)*** 
Group  -0.054     -0.062 -0.193     -0.241 0.058      0.156 
   (0.038)     (0.038)  (0.054)***     (0.055)***  (0.052)     (0.054)*** 
task2  2.097 2.096 2.096 2.262 2.261 2.262 1.700 1.699 1.699 
    (0.053)*** (0.051)*** (0.052)*** (0.075)*** (0.068)*** (0.073)*** (0.073)*** (0.062)*** (0.068)*** 
task3  0.395 0.394 0.394 0.637 0.634 0.637 0.218 0.217 0.216 
    (0.053)*** (0.051)*** (0.052)*** (0.076)*** (0.068)*** (0.073)*** (0.073)*** (0.062)*** (0.068)*** 
task5  -0.261 -0.261 -0.261 -0.396 -0.400 -0.398 -0.126 -0.124 -0.124 
    (0.053)*** (0.051)*** (0.052)*** (0.076)*** (0.068)*** (0.073)*** (0.073)*  (0.062)**  (0.068)* 
luck10  1.154 1.228 1.168 0.998 1.003 1.013 1.219 1.329 1.223 
    (0.085)*** (0.084)*** (0.083)*** (0.12)***  (0.111)*** (0.116)*** (0.116)*** (0.102)*** (0.109)*** 
luck20  0.486 0.517 0.506 0.550 0.512 0.566 0.359 0.498 0.390 
    (0.084)*** (0.083)*** (0.083)*** (0.119)*** (0.111)*** (0.115)*** (0.115)*** (0.101)*** (0.108)*** 
luck30  0.321 0.356 0.331 0.232 0.262 0.275 0.239 0.276 0.218 
    (0.085)*** (0.084)*** (0.084)*** (0.121)*  (0.111)**  (0.117)**  (0.116)**  (0.102)*** (0.109)** 
luck40  0.102 0.175 0.146 0.127 0.206 0.179 -0.004  0.061 0.028 
    (0.082) (0.08)**  (0.081)*  (0.116) (0.107)*  (0.112) (0.112) (0.097) (0.105) 
luck60  -0.177 -0.082 -0.137 -0.176 -0.076 -0.141 -0.151 -0.080 -0.131 
    (0.084)**  (0.083) (0.083)*  (0.12)  (0.111) (0.115) (0.115) (0.101) (0.109) 
luck70  -0.254 -0.219 -0.238 -0.076 -0.116 -0.078 -0.296 -0.208 -0.294 
    (0.083)*** (0.082)*** (0.082)*** (0.118)  (0.109)  (0.114)  (0.113)*** (0.099)**  (0.107)*** 
luck80  -0.347 -0.315 -0.329 -0.075 -0.157 -0.101 -0.402 -0.270 -0.353 
    (0.084)*** (0.083)*** (0.083)*** (0.12)  (0.11)  (0.116)  (0.115)*** (0.101)*** (0.108)*** 
luck90  -0.576 -0.588 -0.568 -0.331 -0.387 -0.328 -0.684 -0.640 -0.665 
    (0.084)*** (0.082)*** (0.083)*** (0.12)***  (0.11)***  (0.116)*** (0.115)*** (0.1)***  (0.108)*** 
luck100  -0.567 -0.552 -0.550 -0.362 -0.382 -0.364 -0.641 -0.603 -0.629 
    (0.084)*** (0.084)*** (0.083)*** (0.12)***  (0.111)*** (0.116)*** (0.115)*** (0.102)*** (0.109)*** 
exp2  -0.006 -0.009 -0.007 -0.041 -0.025 -0.038 0.106  0.086  0.101 
    (0.061) (0.058) (0.06)  (0.086) (0.078) (0.083) (0.083) (0.071) (0.078) 
exp3  0.214 0.213 0.213 0.222 0.234 0.223 0.203 0.188 0.199 
    (0.061)*** (0.058)*** (0.06)***  (0.086)*** (0.078)*** (0.083)*** (0.083)**  (0.071)*** (0.078)*** 
exp4  -0.038 -0.042  -0.040  0.079 0.088 0.078 0.089 0.071 0.084 
    (0.061) (0.058) (0.06)  (0.086) (0.078) (0.083) (0.083) (0.071) (0.078) 
exp5  -0.019 -0.012 -0.019 -0.018 0.003  -0.011 0.021  0.016  0.018 
    (0.061) (0.059) (0.06)  (0.087) (0.078) (0.083) (0.083) (0.071) (0.078) 
Ssrule        0.202        0.086        0.099 
         (0.042)***        (0.061)        (0.061) 
Crule        0.106        -0.716        0.878 
         (0.077)        (0.106)***        (0.105)*** 
Brule        0.156        -0.366        0.653 
         (0.057)***        (0.073)***        (0.074)*** 
Sex        0.121                 0.202 
         (0.046)***                 (0.064)*** 
Age        -0.015                 -0.015 
         (0.005)***                 (0.007)** 
Gpa        0.098                 0.165 
         (0.029)***                 (0.039)*** 
Major                 -0.105        0.351 
                  (0.061)*        (0.061)*** 
Finaid                          -0.132 
                           (0.059)** 
Work                 -0.007        0.005 
                  (0.002)***        (0.002)** 
Cred                 0.001          
                  (0.001)**          
  16Marry                          -0.301 
                           (0.106)*** 
Asian                 0.191          
                  (0.056)***          
Fixed  Effect?  No  Yes  No No Yes  No No Yes  No 
F     2.58        5.99        8.37    
Prob > F     0.000        0.000        0.000    
Rho      0.1169        0.2342        0.2970    
R2  0.7560  0.7548 0.7657 0.6248 0.6184 0.6555 0.5531 0.5514 0.6118 
Subjects  52  52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 
Obs  1038  1038 1038 1038 1038 1038 1038 1038 1038 
 
For each of the three dependent variables, regression (2) seeks fixed effect estimates, 
whereas regressions (1) and (3) do not.  Any explanatory variable that is constant for a given subject 
cannot be included in a fixed effect regression, including the GROUP variable that distinguishes the 
penalty incentive from the bonus.    Regression (1) includes only the variable GROUP among those 
that do not vary by subject, whereas regression (3) includes GROUP and other significant variables 
that do not vary by subject.   These regressions allow us to test for fixed individual differences, 
obtain an indication of what individual characteristics might cause any observed fixed differences, 
and see how a change in the incentive frame affects the composition of decision performance.  
Before commenting on these results, we discuss how we control for problem complexity, luck, and 
experience.   
The dummies task2, task3, and task5 indicate how performance at the complexity levels 2, 
3, and 5 compare to performance on problems at the complexity level 4, since the task4 complexity 
dummy is left out of the regression.  As would be expected, we find total decision performance gets 
significantly and progressively worse as the decision problem gets increasingly complex.  The 
decision quality and decision efficiency regressions indicate that this decline in overall decision 
performance occurs both because poorer quality decisions are made and because more decision 
resources are used.   
  Because there is nothing to guide subjects in their initial trial choice, part of decision 
performance is the result of luck.  Those who happen to select an initial trial close to the optimum 
will tend to experience a better decision performance regardless of their decision making ability.  
Hence, any fixed differences in decision behavior should be judged conditional upon the quality of 
the initial trial choice.  To allow for a non-linear impact, we examine the effect of the initial trial  
non-parametrically.  Let SDIFF denote the difference between   and the number of search points 
associated with the initial trial choice.  The variables luck10 through luck100 shown in Table 4 are 
opt S
  17dummies constructed from the distribution of SDIFF for the particular problem type.  In particular, 
when luck10=1, the initial trial choice is in the top 10 percent of initial trial choices for the given 
problem type.  In contrast, luck100=1 indicates the initial trial is among the lowest 10% in quality.  
The medium quality category luck50 was excluded from the regression to obtain identification, so 
the estimated coefficients on the luck dummies give the marginal impact relative to the luck50 
category.  The results presented in Table 4 demonstrate the importance of recognizing luck.  On 
average, and as would be expected, a subject whose initial trial was closer to the optimum tended to 
perform significantly better.  Moreover, the return to luck is increasing with luck.  So, for example, 
moving from the second most lucky group (luck20=1) to the most lucky group (luck10==1) yields a 
greater improvement in decision performance than a move from the most unlucky group 
(luck100=1) to the next most unlucky group (luck90=1). 
  The dummy variable exp# is equal to 1 when the subject is solving a problem of a particular 
complexity level for the #th time. Overall, it appears that controlling for the effect of experience 
was not particular important.  That is, the experience dummies do not significantly enhance the 
explanatory power of the model. 
  Controlling for problem complexity, luck, and experience, the fixed effect regressions (2) in 
Table 4 indicate there are significant fixed differences in decision behavior.  These differences 
explain 11.7 percent of the variation in observed total performance, a sizeable portion.  
Decomposing total performance, the significant fixed individual differences in the use of decision 
resources (i.e., EFF) explain 29.7 percent of the variation in their use, while fixed differences in the 
ability to find high quality choices (i.e., SMAX)  explain 23.4 percent of the variation in decision 
quality.   
  Fixed effects for total performance, decision quality, and decision efficiency are 
significantly correlated.  The correlation between total performance and decision quality is 0.37 (p-
value=0.0075), while the correlation between total performance and decision efficiency is 0.4382 
(p-value=0.0012).  At the same time, the correlation between decision quality and decision 
efficiency is -0.6007 (p-value=0.0000).  This very strong negative correlation indicates subjects 
who consistently searched less also tended to be those who consistently made decisions of poorer 
quality, and vice versa.  This result not only holds for all problems as shown here, but also for each 
problem type separately.  Thus, we find people can be typed based upon how they obtain improved 
choices.  Some improve by being more patient, effectively using more decision resources to make 
  18better choices.  Others improve by being more decisive, sacrificing decision quality in order to 
conserve decision resources.   
  Regression (3) in Table 4 provides an indication of some observable individual 
characteristics that explain a portion of the fixed differences found in regression (2).  Subjects with 
a higher GPA exhibited higher total decision performance, as did males, and younger subjects.  The 
decision efficiency regression (3) indicates this superior total performance was enabled by the 
conservation of decision resources.  That is, higher GPA students, males, and younger students were 
more decisive.  Non-business majors made higher quality choices than business majors, as did those 
who worked fewer hours, those who took more credits, and those who were Asian.  However, these 
significant differences in decision quality did not translate into higher overall decision performance 
because they were accompanied by an increased use of decision resources.  Those who reported 
using some type of systematic search method performed better, and the regressions indicate having 
a method augments total performance both by conserving decision resources and by being more 
effective a finding higher quality choices.  
  The regressions in Table 4 indicate subjects under the penalty frame were significantly more 
conservative in their use of decision resources than subjects in the bonus frame, which is consistent 
with the results from the hazard model regressions.   That is, a penalty frame encourages 
decisiveness.  The regressions in Table 4 indicate that this increased decisiveness lead to decisions 
of significantly lower quality on average so that overall performance was not better in the penalty 
frame compared to the bonus frame.   
   By including estimated fixed differences from a decision performance as an explanatory 
variable in a hazard model regression, we can examine how fixed differences in individual decision 
ability impact the probability of stopping the search.  The fixed effect for a subject obtained from 
the total performance regression (2) in Table 4 measures how the subject performed overall relative 
to others.  Adding this fixed effect variable ABIL to the All Tasks hazard model regression of Table 
2  yields a hazard ratio of 3.56  (p-value 0.000) for the fixed effect variable.  Thus, individuals who 
performed better on average tended to be more decisive.  Thus, for these decision tasks, 
decisiveness is a virtue overall because it saves search costs.   
  Because expending additional search costs might well be productive, it is hard to believe 
decisiveness is always a virtue.  To examine this issue, we added the variable ABIL to the 2 task, 3 
task, 4 task, and 5 task hazard model regressions reported in Table 2, while also excluding the 
  19observations associated with the initial trial being extremely lucky (where luck10=1). For the 2 task 
and 3 task regressions, the hazard ratios for the variable ABIL were 7.7 (p=.000) and 11.3 (p=.000), 
respectively, so for these more simple problems decisiveness was a virtue.  For the 4 task 
regression, the hazard ratio was .82 (p=.623), implying decisiveness is not a virtue.  For the 5 task 
regression, the hazard ratio was .39 (p=.045), indicating those who performed consistently better 
were able to adjust, and be more patient and search longer when the problem was quite complex and 
the initial trial was not extremely lucky.   
   
5.  Conclusions 
 
Bridger and Long (1984) claim that the process of seeking an optimum emulates key aspects 
of real world jobs.   We find fixed individual differences in the degree of patience/decisiveness 
exhibited by human subjects as they seek optima in our experiment, and we find that a change in the 
frame of the incentive from bonus to penalty alters the degree of patience/decisiveness exhibited by 
the average subject.   Males, business majors, those with GPAs, and who work more hours per week 
were more decisive, while Asians, those married, those with more college credits, and those 
receiving financial aid were more patient. We find people can be placed into two categories based 
upon how they improve their decision performance.  Those more patient sacrifice more decision 
resources to make higher quality choices, while those more decisive sacrifice decision quality in 
order to conserve decision resources.   
De Martino et al (2006) find that a framing bias is associated with activity in the amygdala, 
a region of the brain known for detecting and processing “emotionally relevant” information, and 
speculate that decision making based upon “emotional cues” has evolved  because it is effective in 
particular environments.   In our experimental environment, a penalty frame encourages 
decisiveness in search, while a bonus frame encourages patience, suggesting these two frames 
spawn different emotions.  This is consistent with work in psychology that indicates positive 
reinforcement motivates more effectively than negative reinforcement, while it is not consistent 
with the loss aversion element of prospect theory.     
  Our results suggest it is a mistake to assume decision ability can be measured by cognitive 
skills alone.  Specifically, employers may benefit by matching individual temperaments and 
incentive frames with the task at hand.  Our results suggest simple decisions should be made under 
  20an incentive framed as a penalty by workers chosen for their more decisive temperament.  
Alternatively, more complex decisions should be made under a bonus frame by workers chosen for 
their more patient temperament.  Having demonstrated incentive frame and individual temperament  
impact choice in the laboratory, there is reason to think a field experiments may be useful for 
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Appendix:  Effort Allocation Game Instructions 
 
  Thank you for volunteering to play the Effort Allocation Game. 
 
  As a participant in this experiment, you will face 20 “effort allocation problems.” For each 
problem, there will be “tasks” you will have to “perform.” To perform a task, you must allocate 
“effort” toward it. You will be given an endowment of 200 units of effort. The decision you must 
make is how to allocate your 200 units of effort among the tasks. Allocating more effort toward one 
task allows you to perform that task more effectively. However, allocating more effort to one task 
means you must allocate less effort to some other task. 
 
  Your goal in allocating your effort is to make your “total earnings” as high as possible. Your 
earnings will be paid to you in the form of cash. Because you get the keep the cash that you earn, 
you have an incentive to do as well as you can on each problem. For a given problem, your total 
earnings is the sum of (1) your “wage,” (2) your “decision bonus” and (3) your “efficiency bonus.” 
These three types of earnings will now be described in more detail. 
 
  Your wage is the amount of cash you receive for the problem regardless of how you 
perform. Your wage will be 1 cent for each problem. 
 
  Your efficiency bonus is the amount of cash you are paid for conserving decision-making 
resources. If you accept your first trial as your choice and do so within 15 seconds, then you will 
receive the maximum efficiency bonus, which is 41.9 cents. A fraction of your efficiency bonus will 
be taken from you for each alternative allocation you try. (The computer will show you the cost of 
trying another alternative in terms of the efficiency bonus you will lose). The more alternatives you 
try prior to accepting a choice, the lower your efficiency bonus. You may try at most 25 
alternatives. If you use all 25 alternatives, your efficiency bonus will equal zero, the computer will 
automatically accept your best trial alternative as your choice for the problem, and your total 
earnings will equal your wage plus your decision bonus.  One further point, you have 15 seconds to 
try an alternative. If you wait longer than 15 seconds, you will lose a fraction of your efficiency 
bonus just as you would had you entered a trial allocation.  
 
  Your decision bonus is the amount of cash you earn based the quality of your choice. Better 
effort allocation choices generate larger decision bonuses. (Note: Your decision bonus can be 
negative.) Using trial and error, you can attempt to increase your decision bonus by searching for 
better ways to allocate your effort. For each allocation you try, the computer will display your 
“search points,” which is the decision bonus associated with the trial. To facilitate your memory, the 
computer will keep track of your prior attempts as you try different allocations, showing you your 
last two trials and your best trial.  
 
  After each try, you must decide whether to continue to search or stop your search. When you 
chose to stop, the computer records your best trial as your choice, and the decision bonus you 
  23actually earn will be the search points associated with this best trial.  To become familiar with the 
game, you will first be taken through a standard “administrative game,” where you will have the 
opportunity to experience first hand what you have read here. After completing the administrative 
game, you may ask questions so as to make sure you understand how the game is played. 
Then you will play four “practice games,” where the first practice game involves a two task 
problem, the second practice game involves a three task problem, the third practice game involves a 
four task problem, and the fourth practice game involves a five task problem. Finally, you will play 
20 “real games,” where the number of tasks involved will vary. 
 
  Remember, your goal is to maximize your total earnings over the 20 “real games.” Because 
each game is independent from the others, you will maximize your total earnings by doing as well 
as you can on each individual game. In each game, you can earn up to about 1 dollar (1 cent wage + 
50 cent maximum decision bonus + 49 cent maximum efficiency bonus), meaning you can earn up 
to about $20 in total. 
 
Good luck! 
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